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Why Porn is Wrong: A Theological Perspective
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Why Porn is Wrong: A Theological Perspective
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In Exodus 20:17, the command is given: “You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife.” This commandment is unique from all the other previous commandments which deal primarily with outward acts. Here, for the first time, sins of the heart and mind are revealed as real and harmful. Jesus later emphasizes this point in the New Testament when in Matthew 5:28 he teaches that “- everyone who looks at a woman with lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart” Based on these verses, as well as many others like it, it is obvious throughout the Biblical material that God cares about how people treat each other in their thoughts. It is true that one’s thought life can and does in fact correlate to direct actions; however, just because evil thoughts can lead to evil actions that does not make correlation the sole criterion for declaring such thoughts morally wrong. While there are many ways in which one can sin within the privacy of one’s own mind, this article will deal solely with the one sin of the mind most talked about and thought about: lust. What makes lust wrong independent of external actions? To answer this question this article will examine the work of John Paul II’s Theology of the Body as well as Andrea Dworkin’s impassioned speech against pornography. The discussion of pornography and its moral ramifications is central to this paper; after all, it is perhaps the most visible and common outlet for lust to manifest itself and inject its poison into our modern society. John Paul II argues from a theological standpoint saying that lust is wrong because it reduces the significance of the human body and makes it nothing more than an “object of carnal concupiscence” . Andrea Dworkin agrees with this concept of objectification as the result of lust, and applies it to her case against pornography. She believes that this objectification is not some abstract concept, but rather a concrete and pernicious force against all women; thus, her argument against pornography mainly rests in the statement that objectification is wrong and that pornography always objectifies women. While it is true that pornographers often seek to portray women as mere objects, whether or not women are harmed by this largely depends on individual viewers’ perception; however, pornography and objectification themselves are independently wrong not only on the basis of the physical and mental harm that can be caused, but also because they violates natural law and murder all hope of achieving the respect necessary to fulfill the categorical imperative. Andrea Dworkin speaks out most passionately, proclaiming that pornography is highly injurious and destructive to women everywhere because it objectifies them. By this claim she means that the objectifying of women as is portrayed in much pornographic materials dehumanizes women and discriminates against them all. Dworkin emphasizes this dehumanization: “[She is] turned into a target. And red and purple marks the spot where he’s supposed to get [her]… - those of us who have been her still can barely remember that she is a human being.” Later on in Dworkin’s speech she claims that pornography damages the reputation of all women by portraying them as objects that in fact want to be abused and objectified. This strips away any sign of individuality and makes men view women as good for only one thing and not having the right to anything greater. - She also furthers her claims by arguing that pornographic material suggests that violence against women is acceptable and part of normal life. In short, Dworkin feels that the objectifying of women in pornography harms women in the same way a racist propaganda film harms all people of that particular race which is being portrayed. Dworkin acknowledges and uses the argument that porn and its objectifying nature lead to direct acts of violence and cruelty, but she does not limit her case to these harms alone. She believes that portraying someone in a way that dehumanizes them is cruel regardless of whether or not acts of violence develop as the result: “dehumanizing someone is cruel, and it does not have to be violent in order for it to be cruel.” To Dworkin, there is real and great harm done when the reputation and views of women become distorted for and within the minds of men. Dworkin’s speech succeeds in being very persuasive in showing objectification as harmful and wrong; but is it the case that pornography always objectifies women? Dworkin seems to be saying that porn is wrong because it objectifies women and always does so. In fact she comes very close to defining pornography itself as something that objectifies people (particularly women) as sex objects. What if something could be deemed pornographic material but yet did not in any way portray women as nonhuman inferiors? Or better yet, how could a piece of pornography objectify women if the clients that view it reject the dehumanizing ideas within it? For objectification to take place the viewer must agree and adopt the discriminatory ideas portrayed within the pornographers work, otherwise the objectification has largely not taken place, instead what has occurred is a breakdown in communication between the producer and the viewer. While it is true that pornographers often try to show the women in their productions as undignified objects for men’s sexual gratification – and while it may be evident that the models shown in the work are themselves degraded and objectified – the extension of this harm to all women is an unsound claim that rides on the assumption that the viewer conceptualizes and accepts the models as a representative of the way all women are/should be. Pornography does not always and does not have to objectify women - although it certainly can and whether or not it does is primarily up to the individual viewer. Dworkin’s argument seems to assume that men, after viewing pornographic material, walk away with new ideas and beliefs and prehaps even new behaviors toward women. This seems very unlikely for the great majority of men. In short, if pornography harms in the same manner as a racist propaganda film, it can only perform real and concrete harm when the propaganda is accepted by the viewer. Also, it seems very possible to create a work that is intended to cause sexual excitement (and is thus pornographic) but yet does not discriminate or in anyway objectify women. For example, a couple could make a movie about their wedding night. The film could be erotic but clearly not objectifying or portraying one gender as head over the other. The film could even be perceived as promoting the “nuptial” or “matrimonial” dimension of human beings as discussed by John Paul II as being the concept of both members of a couple giving themselves as a gift to the other. The people who view the video would not be encouraged by it to objectify women; so one then asks the question: if a certain pornographic work does not succeed in making its viewers objectify others, and if the work itself does not support the objectifying and dehumanizing of others, what then makes it wrong? What makes the idea of viewing someone’s private wedding night video (even with permission) seem to still be morally repugnant? These problems demonstrate that pornography is wrong for other reasons beyond just the fact that it can and does have a dangerous potential to cause objectification. To tackle these problems one must ponder for a moment the question: ‘what is man’? If humankind is greater than the animals of the earth then logically there is something significant and special about our kind. Indeed the Bible’s creation story is full of the ways in which human kind is significant. Everyday when we wake up in our heated and cooled houses we are reminded that we are obviously set apart and special above all other creatures of the earth. Our bodies and minds are significant. This is part of the natural law that C.S. Lewis would say all humankind is aware of. John Paul II’s Theology of the Body deals in great detail with the profound significance of the body. Based on this principal of significance, one can say that pornography is wrong because it takes away from the beauty of the God’s creation by reducing it to a mere means to an end, namely: to satisfy the sexual desires of the body and gain instant gratification. On these grounds pornography is wrong for two more reasons because it fails the categorical imperative in two ways: first, because it is wrong to use another person as a means, and second because one can not reasonably wish to universalize any maxim that includes instant sexual gratification. Thus, even someone that lives all by themselves drawing pictures of imaginary women for their own enjoyment and causing no visable harm to anyone is still doing something morally wrong, not just on the basis of Kant’s categorical imperative, but also because this loner would be inevitably obscuring the significance of the body and reducing it. Also, due to the fact that pornography has been shown to be addictive it is then wrong again based on Kantian ethics as well as utilitarianism and the natural law. Pornography can also be seen as a betrayal to the natural order of things by reducing humans to the same level as the animals. On the groundwork of the arguments above one can easily say that objectification, if and when it happens the way Dworkin describes is also wrong for it not only shows near contempt for the significance of the body, it can and does cause real utilitarian harms. Dworkin explains: “…sexualization and dehumanization, is always concrete and specific;”… “insults and assaults… - happen to real women in real life.” Other none sexual forms of objectification are just as wrong although they may not cause the same level of utilitarian harms that sexual objectification can cause. They still have the potential to disrupt normal relationships and would certainly not pass Kantian ethics. Hence, it would be wrong to value someone only because they can help you solve math problems and for no other reason would one even associate with them.
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