Dennet's Compatabilist View of Free Will

ladsin

In many of the conversations I've had the idea of determinism as opposed to free will comes up. Some people show consternation at the concept, others may be depressed when they in fact find out that determinism undermines free will, but is this truly the case? Does determinism undermine free will? In this myTake I will do my best to describe one popular response to this belief. The compatabilist says that there is some way in which these two ideas can be reconciled so that both are still meaningful.

Dennet's Compatabilist View of Free Will

What is the problem?

The problem is that determinism, the view that all events including human thoughts and actions, are the results of a series of prior events ad infinitum until the origin of the universe. This is a simple extension of the law of cause and effect. Recently, neuroscience appears to be vindicating this view. It appears that our brains make a decision, and then later we rationalize, saying that it was a cognizant choice. (Wegner & Wheatley) Some research even shows that our brain makes a decision as far as 10 seconds before we become aware of it. (Haynes) Some philosophers say that this admission makes a mockery of the idea of free-will, and as such we must get rid of it.

Is it true?

According to Dennet it is most certainly true that certain types of free will are incompatible with determinism, but that in his estimation none of the things that we actually value about free will are lost. On this point many authors will claim that Dennet is obfuscating the topic by redefining free will. Persons like Strawson will emphatically state "It (Compatabilism) doesn't give us what we want and are sure we have: ultimate, buck-stopping responsibility for what we do, of a kind that can make blame and punishment and praise and reward truly just and fair."

Dennet's Compatabilist View of Free Will

Dennet's Response

It is certainly true that certain concepts of free will are incompatible with determinism, and he's said that since the beginning. He finds this vitriol and confusion quite funny, he makes an allusion to a friend (X) that is writing a book on magic. People ask X, "REAL MAGIC?" X responds, "Well no, not real magic, parlor tricks, slight of hand, that sort of thing." Dennet laughed that the "real magic" doesn't exist, and in fact the magic that did exist and can be demonstrated people consider to be fake. He thinks that this perfectly sums up what he thinks about this type of response. He says, "Yes, you have free will. It's just not what you thought it was."

We're not looking at the correct scale

Dennet points out that he thinks we're looking at free-will in the wrong way. He points out that people talk about the determinancy of physics is irrelevant when talking about free will. We're greater than the sum of our parts. A quark doesn't have free will, but we do.

What is inevitable/ evitable

"The future is inevitable", this means nothing. There is going to be a future regardless. When you say the future is inevitable I don't know what you mean. What we should be talking about is whether or not certain events, or types of events are evitable or not. This simply means that something is avoidable. We can avoid all sorts of things. The whole idea of inevitability implies a scenario in which something actually has desires. Whether or not it can achieve those goals is what we're addressing. We look at a particular agent to determine what things it can and cannot avoid. Because there's so much evitability in this deterministic world the claim that determinism leads to inevitability is just wrong.

What is it that we really want?

An indeterminate universe is actually one that we wouldn't like. We want our actions to have a determinable response. What we really want is to be free from the control of other agents. We want to be able to determine the outcomes of our actions, but we don't want others to be able to determine our actions. To explain this concept he gives a rather humorous analogy of picking a box of cereal. To avoid getting in trouble I'll just restate the example using cereal X instead of the brand name. Silly I know, but whatever.

1.) Cereal box X has been recommended to me by doctor because it is good for my health, I believe him so I buy it.

2.) Cereal X has a picture of a scantily clad beautiful woman on the box. I know that sex sells, but I don't care I like the packaging so I'm going to buy it.

3.) There's a secret microchip transponder within the cereal that stimulates my nuculus accumbens causing me to have a rush of ecstasy and as a result I buy the box.

He points out that in each of the scenarios above he was caused to buy the cereal by an outside agent, but the one that we have an aversion to is the last one. Why is this? He says this is because of the secrecy involved. He points out that this is the primary thing that we care about in regards to free will.

But what about moral responsibility?

Dennet rightly points out that one concern frequently pointed out by others is that many people who deny the existence of free will are using it as a platform to destroy the concept of justice. They'll say that if a person isn't truly responsible for their actions then how can we punish them for it? I think first he would point out that there is a problem in the question, why say "TRULY responsible" why not just say responsible? It seems to me that those two questions could lead to different answers. Secondly, he would point out that most humans belong to a moral agents club. What this means is that as a part of a society we agree to live by a certain set of norms and accept punishment for not adhering to these. He says these rules, and our concept of responsibility is just as real as money. He's pointing out that there is no morality when a person is on there own, morality only has to deal with our interactions among other members.

Dennet's Compatabilist View of Free Will

Disagreement:

Many people disagree with Dennet, but most of them deal with criticizing Dennet for not defending the libertarian or spiritual notion of free will. This is pointless, he says explicitly that this is not the idea he is arguing for. Sam Harris has written quite extensively on the contrary position, but one thing he brings up in particular that I find noteworthy is that when people are talking about free will one important aspect that people want is the ability to have done differently.

The end, as always responses/ criticisms are appreciated. I'm sure that I can't properly do justice to all of Dennet's work on the subject, so buy his books Consciousness Explained, Elbow Room and many others available at fine book stores everywhere XD


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Dennet's Compatabilist View of Free Will
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